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Transitional Social Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland 
 
MITCHELL ORENSTEIN* 
Department of Political Sciences, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA 
Abstract: Social policy has influenced both the popularity of economic reforms and 
the fate of reformist politicians throughout East Central Europe. With careful plan-
ning, social policies can be used to ameliorate the costs of economic reform. Yet 
some countries in East Central Europe have rated the social dimension of transfor-
mation more highly than others. In the Czech Republic, post-1989 governments 
made social policy an essential part of their transformation project, while Poland’s 
“shock therapists” ignored or postponed dealing with the social dimension. As a re-
sult, the Czech Republic prevented social problems from causing a political back-
lash and began to construct or reconstruct the institutions of the welfare state. Lack 
of attention to social policy and poor state planning in Poland caused a misallocation 
of scarce resources and a disintegration of key elements of the social safety net. 
Loss of social security in Poland contributed to public displeasure with the course of 
reform and to the post-communist victory in parliamentary elections in 1993. De-
spite a continuing feud between neo-liberal and social-democratic approaches, the 
Czech Republic has created a basic framework for a reborn welfare state, while Po-
land has not progressed beyond reactive, stopgap measures. 
Czech Sociological Review, 1995, Vol. 3 (No. 2: 179-196) 
Transforming post-socialist economies confront vastly different social policy challenges 
from those of developed welfare states. Thinking of the special problems of transition in 
East Central Europe, Claus Offe [1993: 652] identifies a logical progression of three so-
cial policy stages that countries must traverse: “emergency measures, institution-building, 
and reform and adjustment within established social policy institutions.” Emergency 
measures are ad hoc or discretionary procedures intended to cope with pressing transi-
tion-induced social problems such as rising unemployment. Once these are addressed, 
governments may construct new social policy institutions that fit the demands of the new 
economic system. Only after this process of institution-building is relatively advanced is 
it possible to speak of “‘normal’ social policies, including an ongoing process of institu-
tional reform and adaptation” [Ibid.: 655]. I will argue that because the Czech Republic 
and Poland followed different overall strategies of socio-economic transformation in the 
immediate post-1989 period, the Czech Republic has entered the phase of institution-
building and is well on the way to a “normal” social policy, while Poland has yet to ad-
vance beyond emergency measures. Differences in financial resources and initial condi-
tions alone do not account for observed policy results. 
Different social policy outcomes in the Czech Republic and Poland can be closely 
linked to strategic choices about the general course of reform. Post-1989 governments in 
the two countries adopted different strategies of radical economic reform: shock therapy 
in Poland and a social-liberal or social-market approach in the Czech Republic. These 
                                                     
*) Direct all correspondence to Mitchell Orenstein, P.O. Box 206091, New Haven, CT 06520. 
Funding for the research of this paper was provided by the International Research and Exchange 
Board (IREX), Yale University, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
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strategies were distinguished, in part, by their attitudes toward the social dimension of the 
transformation process. In shock therapy, as outlined and explained in the writings of Jef-
frey Sachs and Leszek Balcerowicz, two of the most prominent architects of the “big 
bang,” the main object was to create markets and capitalism. These tasks, including price 
liberalization, macro-economic stabilization and privatization, had to be completed 
quickly, before strongly-organized interests could mobilize to block reforms that were in 
the interest of the country as a whole. Building or reconstructing social welfare institu-
tions could wait for a further stage in the reform process. Jeffrey Sachs [1994: 5] writes 
explicitly that, “Although there are many submodels within Western Europe, with distinct 
versions of the modern welfare state, the Western European economies share a common 
core of capitalist institutions. It is that common core that should be the aim of the Eastern 
European reforms. The finer points of choosing between different submodels – the Scan-
dinavian social welfare state, Thatcherism, the German social market – can be put off un-
til later, once the core institutions are firmly in place.” 
Radical neo-liberals in Czechoslovakia, including former Finance Minister Václav 
Klaus, probably agreed with this assessment. But in the first Czechoslovak governments 
from 1989-92, Klaus’ view was not that of the majority. These first federal governments 
included former party members who, although probably not convinced Marxists, did have 
a vaguely social-democratic political outlook, and several 1968ers, advocates of “social-
ism with a human face,” who had been banished from Prague during “normalization,” but 
were still infused with the vision and ideals of a wildly popular economic reform program 
with a strong social-democratic content. Furthermore, President Václav Havel, while an 
indomitable opponent of communism, was no great friend of capitalism. He wrote scath-
ing attacks on consumerism in the West and advocated moral, rather than economic, de-
velopment. His political allies were more left-leaning on economic issues than Klaus’ 
team, when they understood economics at all. The result of having Klaus at the Ministry 
of Finance and Petr Miller (a future member of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic 
Party) at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was intense disputation, ending in a 
compromise embodied in Klaus and Vladimír Dlouhý’s Radical Strategy of Economic 
Reform, passed by the government in April 1990. Klaus won on price liberalization, mac-
roeconomic stabilization, and privatization, but the social democrats won on social pol-
icy. Klaus needed the votes of at least some of the social democrats to get his program 
through the government, so he accepted into his own program a social policy section 
drafted entirely by Petr Miller’s Labour Ministry [Myant 1993: 177; interviews by the 
author with Petr Miller and Igor Tomeš]. The result of this social-liberal hybrid embodied 
in the “radical” strategy was the construction of the basic institutions and principles of a 
new welfare state concurrent with neo-liberal economic reform. Although there has been 
significant debate over the future of social policy in the Czech Republic, during the first 
five years of reform, the social-liberal strategy succeeded in ameliorating some of the 
most significant social costs of the transformation and began the process of founding new 
social policy institutions. 
Czech Social-Liberalism 
One of the ironies of the Czech transformation is that its successes in the social policy 
arena have been shielded from public view by the neo-liberal rhetoric of Prime Minister 
Václav Klaus. Klaus often calls for a market economy “without adjectives,” rather than a 
social-market economy, and has become the most prominent advocate of Thatcherism in 
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East Central Europe. Nonetheless, the Czech Republic was much less Thatcherite in its 
social policy than Poland, where privatization of the health service followed quickly after 
1989 and a laissez-faire attitude towards the social dimension of reform has generally 
prevailed. As one Czech sociologist gently put it, “the rather low impact of Right-wing 
ideologies on social policy matters” in the Czech Republic is remarkable, despite their 
strong role in shaping macroeconomic policy [Potùèek 1994a]. Since Klaus’ victory in 
the June 1992 elections in the Czech lands and the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, he 
has attempted to shift social policy more in line with his brand of neo-liberal thinking, but 
has faced resistance from already-established institutions founded under a social-
democratic policy regime. In many cases, Klaus has not fundamentally altered them. 
The social-democratic or rather social-liberal vision that prevailed in the Czech 
Republic immediately after 1989 had both a short-term and a long-term component. In 
the short term, the policy planners intended to cushion the effects of the economic trans-
formation through a range of transitional measures. Many of these were laid out in the 
“radical” strategy document prepared by Klaus and Dlouhý in early 1990. In the long run, 
a thorough reconstruction of the social welfare system was envisaged that “would moti-
vate individuals and social groups into action, would lead to social independence and re-
sponsibility of the citizen and of whole social groups for their own social situation” 
[Miller et al. 1993: 7]. The goal was to create a welfare state based on liberal principles 
that would be compatible with a market economy and support political democracy. 
Of the short-term measures, probably the central one was the concept of compen-
sating citizens for cuts in consumer subsidies with direct cash payments. Food subsidies 
were slashed in mid-1990 and abolished completely in the first few months of 1991 
[Koèárník 1992: 27], but the money that had previously been paid to food producers was 
now paid directly to food consumers, though only for a few years. Compensation 
amounted to 140 crowns per month per person, or around 5% of the average wage. Com-
pensation payments for the loss of food subsidies amounted to over 6 billion crowns in 
1991 and over 7 billion in 1992 ($256 million) [Czech… 1994: 166] and were then gradu-
ally reduced from 1993 to 1995, being paid only to lower income families as part of an 
attempt to introduce greater targetting of social benefits [Heady and Smith 1994: 31]. 
While the government levied no tax on food from 1990-1992, in January 1993 the value-
added tax (VAT) was introduced and food began to be taxed at the lower 5% rate. So 
through a combination of tax policy and direct cash payments, Czech citizens were pro-
tected to a significant extent from the vast increase in food prices caused by price liberali-
zation in 1990 and 1991. Partly because of the lack of taxation, food prices grew much 
less dynamically from 1990-92 than prices for non-food goods, rising 74.2 percent over 
their 1989 levels, as compared to 104.4 percent for non-food goods, thus significantly 
limiting the level of inflation [Czech… 1994: 153]. 
Czech Sociological Review, III, (2/1995) 
182 
Table 1. Consumer Price Index of Goods and Services, Czech Republic 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total 100 109.9 172.2 191.3 
Food goods 100 110.5 159.7 174.2 
Services 100 106.9 148.6 186.6 
Public catering 100 110.1 174.8 189.5 
Non-food goods 100 110.5 187.5 204.4 
Source:  Czech Statistical Office [Czech… 1994: 160]. 
 
An additional transitional policy continued government subsidies of basic consumer 
costs, such as rent, heat, electricity, and transport. Although the total level of subsidies in 
the Czech Republic was cut from 15 percent to 5 percent of GDP [Koèárník 1992: 7], the 
remaining subsidies were almost entirely targeted towards alleviating the social costs of 
reform. Czech rail fares did not increase at all between 1990 and 1994, making the Czech 
passenger train system the cheapest in Europe. A Union Bank of Switzerland study in 
1994 found that Prague had the cheapest municipal mass transit system and the lowest 
wages of all the European cities included. A ten kilometer ride in Prague in 1994 cost 
$0.20, while a similar ride in Zürich cost $2.24. Wages in Prague were, on average, ten 
percent lower than in Budapest. Food prices were lower than in Manila, Cairo, Bogota, or 
Jakarta. And in Prague, a Czech could still find a small apartment for as low as $40 per 
month. 
Rent control and rent subsidies were perhaps the most controversial element of the 
transitional social policy. For they concerned over a hundred thousand landlords who had 
apartment buildings “returned” to them through restitution as well as many others who 
had tenants in their privately-owned homes throughout the communist period. Since rent 
control clearly did not benefit everyone, and reflected a state-imposed restriction on own-
ers of private property, Klaus was frequently attacked for not living up to his Thatcherite 
rhetoric on this issue. Klaus answered critics publicly in one of his regular weekly articles 
in Lidové noviny, a pro-government daily newspaper, entitled, “Why we still regulate 
rents” (25 April 1994). Klaus argued that instant deregulation of the housing market 
would cause enormous social problems and cost the state budget a great deal of money. 
Noting that rent de-regulation would also force a reallocation of money from tenants to 
home-owners, Klaus asked “whether we must perform this reallocation at the height of 
the transformation process, together with not small complications for many of our people, 
or whether we want to spread it out into a further time period.” It should be noted that 
Klaus had previously declared the transformation process complete in a speech in the 
West Bohemian city of Plzeò. Apparently that did not apply to the housing sector. Rent 
controls were eased between 1992 and 1995, allowing a dramatic increase in rents only 
after the massive 1991 price liberalization. But even when rents doubled, since the initial 
level was so low, the average low-income working class household spent only 16.9 per-
cent of its income on rent in 1992 [Czech… 1994: 172]. The following table shows that 
government-controlled service prices, including rent, grew much less rapidly than prices 
of other goods, especially in 1991. Table 3 shows that government-controlled prices for 
rent, fuel, and health care grew much less rapidly in the Czech Republic than in Poland, 
relative to growth in the consumer price index. 
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Table 2.  Consumer Price Index of Services (Czech Republic) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total (All Goods and Services) 100 109.9 172.2 191.3 
All Services, including: 100 106.9 148.6 186.6 
Administrative, notarial, court, local  
and other fees, insurance, etc. 100 100.3 102.9 114.1 
Housing rent and municipal services 100 100.1 144.7 209.6 
Education, culture, entertainment  
and sports 100 107.5 144.7 166.4 
Transport and communications 100 107.6 150.9 173.9 
Recreation, health care,  
social facilities, etc. 100 128.6 178.6 192.0 
Source:  Czech Statistical Office [Czech… 1994: 160]. 
 
Table 3. Relative Price Changes in the Czech Republic and Poland, 1989-1993 
(1989=100) 
Relative Price of: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Gross Rent and Water Charges 
 Czech Republic 100.0 93.5 95.4 124.5 134.5 
 Poland 100.0 120.2 158.1 176.5 174.2 
Fuel and Power 
 Czech Republic 100.0 91.7 98.4 117.8 108.7 
 Poland 100.0 182.4 304.8 413.9 449.7 
Health 
 Czech Republic 100.0 109.9 112.5 125.3 157.9 
 Poland 100.0 136.1 155.0 169.0 171.0 
Education 
 Czech Republic 100.0 92.4 78.2 95.0 96.1 
 Poland 100.0 97.4 129.4 136.3 132.9 
Source: Unicef [“Crisis…” 1994: 100]. Relative prices reflect changes in the 
price of certain items compared to the change in the total consumer 
price index, essentially inflation-adjusted price changes from a 1989 
base level. 
 
Long-Term Social Policy and Institution Building 
Compensation payments, consumer subsidies, and rent control were mainly viewed as 
transitional measures, but the 1990 scenario for social reform also prepared the basis for a 
long-term reconstruction of the social safety net. Fundamental to this was a reformation 
of the “living minimum”, implemented with the passage of federal law 463/1991 and sub-
sequent republic legislation [Prùša 1993: 33]. The living minimum was intended to define 
a guaranteed level of social income below which no citizen would be allowed to fall. 
Planned and implemented with technical assistance from the International Labour Or-
ganization and funding from the European Union, the living minimum provided a univer-
sal standard for minimum pensions, social benefits, unemployment benefits, and the 
minimum wage level. Czech governments are required to revise the living minimum 
yearly in line with changes in the consumer price index and average wages. At the end of 
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1991, when the living minimum law took effect, an estimated 125,000 households – 3 
percent of the total number – were living below the minimum. This number rose to 
158,000 in the first quarter of 1992 before falling to 120,000 later that year [Prùša 1993: 
35]. The proportion of households living below the official minimum remained around 3 
percent throughout the transformation. Since the living minimum was not only calculated 
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, but actually implemented through the central 
and local networks of welfare and labor offices, very few Czech citizens experienced ex-
treme poverty during the transformation, although the vast majority suffered a decline in 
income, and considered themselves to be living on or around the border of subsistence in 
1992, subjectively defined [Potùèek 1993: 211]. 
Graph 1. Extreme poverty (left) and poverty (right) rates (in percent) 















1989 1990 1991 1992
 
Source: Unicef [“Crisis…” 1994: 2]. Unicef calculates the poverty line at 40 percent 
of the 1989 average wage (not the current average wage) for Poland and 35 percent 
of the 1989 average wage for the Czech Republic. This definition and data may 
overestimate poverty [Schwartz 1994]. For this reason, Unicef also calculates ex-
treme poverty, which they define as 60 percent of the poverty line. Here the effects 
of the living minimum in the Czech Republic can be seen. 
 
The following table shows that under Klaus, the living minimum fell 8-9 percent below 
its initial 1991 level, but has since been maintained in real terms. This is a good example 
of the extent of Klaus’ neo-liberalism in the social policy arena. State generosity was re-
duced slightly, but the program remained fundamentally unchanged. 
Table 4. Increases in Living Minimum for a Four-Member Family, Czech Re-
public 
 Nominal Payment Real Value Index 
Month/Year  (Czech crowns) (1991 level = 100) 
11/1991 5600 100 
3/1993 6400 91 
2/1994 7060 92 
1/1995 7840 92 
Source: Mladá fronta Dnes, 9 December 1994, p. 2. Figures are for a four-
member family with two parents and two children between 10-15 
years of age. 
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After the reformulation of the living minimum in 1991, the next great step in creat-
ing a new welfare state came in January 1993 with the initiation of a tax reform that insti-
tuted separate payroll taxes for pension and sickness insurance, unemployment benefits 
and active labor market policies, and health insurance. Health insurance payments were 
henceforth to be collected by an extra-budgetary General Health Insurance Fund, al-
though later reforms allowed citizens to choose to direct their contributions to a variety of 
public and private health care funds. The separation of health insurance from the state 
budget, with a guaranteed source of payroll tax income, was a major step in changing the 
methods of health care finance, and one that has not yet occurred in Poland, where health 
care funding comes directly from the state budget and was thus vulnerable to budget cuts, 
falling 9.2 percent in 1991 in real terms [Golinowska 1994: 36]. 
Table 5. Dedicated Payroll Taxes in the Czech Republic and Poland, 1994  
(in percent) 
 Pension &  Unemploy- Health 
 Sickness  ment Insurance 
 Benefits Policies Fund Total 
Czech Republic 32.00 3.00 13.50 48.50 
Poland 45.00* 3.00 – 48.00 
Employer contribution: 
Czech Republic 24.00 2.25 9.50 35.75 
Poland 45.00 3.00 – 48.00 
Employee contribution: 
Czech Republic 8.00 0.75 4.00 12.75 
Poland 0.00 0.00 – 0.00 
Sources: Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs [Social Protection… 
1994] and Institute of Labour and Social Studies [Social Policy… 
1994] for Poland. 
*) In Poland, the 45 percent contribution to FUS also covers family and maternity 
benefits that are funded out of the general budget in the Czech Republic. Therefore 
the numbers in this column are not strictly comparable. 
 
Pension and sickness benefits were not fully separated from the state budget, a source of 
dispute between the government and trade unions, but a Czech Social Security Admini-
stration was founded with a network of district offices, under the direct authority of the 
Labor Ministry. Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Jindøich Vodièka, explained the 
government’s unwillingness to create an independent fund, saying, “We do not want to 
surrender the possibility of the state not only to formulate, but also to directly pursue par-
ticular goals of social policy. (…) Besides that, a complete separation of social insurance 
from the state budget would require an automatic system of indexation” (interview in 
Ekonom 41: 1993). The government wished to maintain control over the goals and financ-
ing of social policy and prevent the system from becoming a drain on the state budget. By 
contrast in Poland, fully 20 percent of the state budget was paid as a subsidy to the defi-
cit-ridden Social Insurance Fund (FUS) and the Retirement-Disability Fund for Farmers 
(FRUS) in 1992, adding significantly to Poland’s fiscal crisis [Golinowska 1994: 31]. In 
the Czech Republic, the social insurance fund has collected more than enough money to 
cover outlays, with a 17.5 billion crown ($625 million) surplus in 1993. The remaining 
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money was used to subsidize state budget expenditures on social assistance, much to the 
exasperation of the trade unions who want the money placed in a separate fund and used 
only for future pension and sickness benefits (Hospodáøské no-viny, 21 April 1994). 
Visible employee contributions to the Social Security Fund were intended to in-
crease the transparency of the social welfare system and to introduce a sense of individual 
responsibility. In the communist past, individuals had taxes automatically deducted from 
their pay and did not know how much went for pension, health, or other benefits. Re-
formers believed that employee contributions would make citizens realize the full cost of 
the social safety net and therefore reduce demands on the paternalistic provision of the 
state. The tax reform emphasized the principle of insurance, rather than universal free 
provision from general funds for pensions and health. A stronger link was established 
between individual contributions and benefits, although basic health and pension insur-
ance were made mandatory, with the state filling in for people unable to pay. Thereby a 
level of social solidarity was maintained and a minimum level of benefits insured. With 
the tax reforms of 1993, the Czech Republic entered the institution-building phase of its 
social policy transformation. 
Klaus’ victory in the June 1992 elections caused a shift away from the social-
liberal principles that underlay earlier plans and attempts to reform the health and pension 
systems. While the changes were not immediate or dramatic, the focus and philosophy of 
Czech social policy clearly changed from 1992 to 1995, more or less in line with a new 
neo-liberal philosophy. The aims of the new social policy were to eliminate corporatist 
elements contained in previous social-liberal programs, to reduce state responsibility by 
relying only on minimum benefit levels, and to target social support only to those living 
within a narrow band just above the living minimum [Veèerník 1994: 8]. Klaus and his 
team have to some extent successfully redefined and reoriented the development of the 
Czech welfare state, although in certain areas the new deal faced social resistance and had 
to be amended. 
Supplementary Pension System: Neo-Liberalism in Practice 
The new Czech supplementary pension system, introduced in 1995, best reflects the neo-
liberal vision of social policy. In comparison to previous proposals, which had envisaged 
joint management of pension funds by trade unions and employers, the new Czech system 
relies on individual pension savings accounts to supplement the basic social security 
scheme described above. In defiance of International Labour Organization norms and 
general practice worldwide, employers were not required to make any contribution to 
their employees’ supplementary pensions, leaving responsibility to the individual citizen 
and the state. Individuals make monthly payments into a capitalized pension savings ac-
count, and are rewarded with a matching payment from the state budget. Employers may 
contribute to their employees’ pension accounts, but only on a voluntary basis, or as regu-
lated by collective bargaining agreements and individual labor contracts. Obviously em-
ployers gain from this type of liberalism, while the benefits to employees remain to be 
seen. The individual and contractual nature of the new pension system angered the Czech 
trade unions, who had hoped to participate in the management of enterprise-based em-
ployee pension funds. After years of ineffective opposition within the tripartite Council 
for Economic and Social Accord, the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (ÈM-
KOS) called a 24-hour protest strike in December 1994 as a last-ditch attempt to stop the 
government pension program from going forward (Mladá fronta Dnes, 14 December 
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1994). Despite a reasonable turnout, however, the trade unions failed to communicate 
clearly to the population the main reasons for their opposition and the government pro-
gram was implemented in 1995 over their objections. The unions’ failure to take advan-
tage of a potentially popular issue (most Czechs opposed an increase in the retirement 
age, an important element of the pension reform) reflects their overall weakness and in-
ability to mobilize support. This institutional malaise facilitated Klaus’ construction of a 
neo-liberal pension policy regime. It is too early to assess the benefits of the supplemen-
tary pension system. Klaus’ government believes capitalized pension funds will encour-
age economic growth by channeling public savings into the stock and bond markets, 
benefitting both pensioners and the economy as a whole. A long-term plan is to reduce 
the size of the basic state pension to approximately 35 percent of the average wage, 
thereby increasing reliance on the “second pillar” of individual pension accounts. 
Health System in Transformation 
The transformation of the health care system began immediately after the Velvet Revolu-
tion of 1989, at first led by a small group of activists within the Civic Forum committee 
of health personnel, which published a set of principles for health care reform in January 
1990. These activists formed the core of the Ministry of Health Working Group for Re-
form that published a proposal for health care reform in May 1990 for public discussion. 
After a process of debate and consultation with health care professionals and associations, 
and within the government, the Czech government passed a set of “Principles of a New 
System of Health Care” at the end of 1990 that guided reform efforts over the next two 
years [Potùèek 1994b]. Essentially, the Czech government proposed to maintain state-
guaranteed universal access to a relatively high standard of care, while decentralizing 
control over health care providers. Citizens would be free to use the provider of their 
choice, whether public or private; and providers would be paid a standard fee for all ser-
vices from a central health insurance fund. Contributions to the insurance fund would 
come from employees and employers, or from the state, in the case of non-working peo-
ple. 
The 1990 principles reflected the social-liberal views of the Civic Forum health 
committee and Czech Minister of Health, Martin Bojar. The social element of their phi-
losophy was reflected in their plans to maintain state-guaranteed access to a standard 
level of health care. It was liberal insofar as it planned for competition among health care 
providers and allowed citizens to freely choose their doctors and hospitals. The social-
liberals were opposed by a group of neo-liberals led by the chairman of the parliamentary 
committee for social policy and health care, Petr Lom, who later became Klaus’ first ap-
pointee to lead the Ministry of Health. Neo-liberals supported rapid privatization of 
health care facilities, rather than a de-centralization that placed many facilities in munici-
pal ownership. They also believed in higher pay for doctors, and increased opportunity to 
pay higher prices for a higher level of service [Potùèek 1994b: 16].1 
                                                     
1) The Czech Prime Minister at the time was Petr Pithart, a friend of Havel’s, and while Klaus did 
not control the government, he had a strong base of support in parliament. After Klaus won the 
presidency of Civic Forum in October 1990 against Havel’s candidate, Martin Palouš, he con-
trolled Civic Forum’s parliamentary club, while the government became a de facto minority gov-
ernment. Klaus’ group within Civic Forum evolved into the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), while 
Havel’s group became the Civic Movement (OH) and lost the 1992 elections. 
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From 1990 to 1992, health care reform followed the social-liberal principles. In 
1990 and 1991, the Regional and District Institutes of National Health were abolished and 
replaced by Local Associations of Health Services, a somewhat chaotic process that 
vastly increased the number of health care providers and enlarged the space for independ-
ent decision-making. In 1991 and 1992, parliament passed a great deal of major legisla-
tion, including acts on health insurance and the General Health Insurance Fund, and an 
act on non-governmental health facilities that created the legal basis for private health 
care providers. The General Health Insurance Fund was established at the end of 1991 
with the task of planning and implementing a new system of health care finance. The 
Fund published a list of allowable fees for all types of medical procedures in May 1992 
[Potùèek 1993: 220]. 
Neo-liberals in parliament were dismayed at the monopoly of health care finance 
by the General Insurance Fund, and drafted a law on Sectional, Professional, Corporate, 
and Other Health Insurance Funds that passed into law in 1992. This law liberalized the 
health insurance market, but in doing so undermined the whole social-liberal system of 
health care financing. When the General Health Insurance Fund began to accept payroll 
tax contributions in 1993, a variety of other funds competed with it for contributions. 
These funds were typically marketed toward healthy, younger individuals, and offered 
higher payments to health care providers. This competition threatened to leave the Gen-
eral Fund with only the older, sicker, and poorer individuals, a high deficit and lower fee 
payments, so the state introduced a complicated system of redistribution among the funds, 
in proportion to the number of older members [Výborná 1994: 12]. 
While the Czech Republic maintained universal access to health care throughout 
the transition period, the new health care system is riven with problems. The current fee-
for-service system of insurance allows health care providers a degree of flexibility in their 
charges, creating tremendous cost inflation that now threatens to bankrupt the insurance 
funds or force higher payroll taxes. Accounting systems are in disarray and doctors’ sala-
ries remain very low [Výborná 1994: 14-15]. In the summer of 1995, the death of a man 
in Moravia erupted into a mass media scandal and heightened public awareness of the 
problems of health care finance. The man’s family claimed that he had been denied care 
at a local hospital because his private insurance company had been severely indebted to 
the hospital in question and had just recently had its contract cancelled. The possibility 
that care might be denied for financial reasons disturbed the Czech population and at-
tested to the failure of an ill-planned, ill-conceived neo-liberal reform in this area. As part 
of his effort to introduce a minimal welfare state, Klaus wants to change the basic princi-
ple of equal care for all by introducing the possibility of making extra payments for extra 
services, limiting the free choice of providers, and allowing insurance companies to com-
bine with providers in health maintenance organizations. However a clear neo-liberal ap-
proach to health care has not yet emerged, and equal universal coverage still exists in the 
Czech Republic. 
Conflict Over Social Support  
Beside pension and health care insurance, a key element of any welfare state is a system 
of direct state payments of social benefits to individuals and families. In the Czech Re-
public, some of these benefits were historically universal in coverage, like the child bene-
fit that was paid to all mothers of children under three years of age. Some were also 
targeted to particularly needy social groups, such as invalids or parents of handicapped 
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children. One of the main goals of the Klaus government’s welfare reforms has been to 
eliminate universal benefits and instead to offer state support only to families with in-
comes in a relatively narrow band above the living minimum. Klaus’ attempt to introduce 
targeting of parent and child benefits in 1995 met with a great deal of resistance and pub-
lic debate, forcing the government to withdraw its initial proposal from parliament. Op-
ponents of targeting, including the trade unions, argued that means-testing required far 
higher administrative costs and had little social benefit. An independent analysis by Brit-
ish tax experts showed that the government’s original targeting proposal would signifi-
cantly reduce the number of families living at less than 1.25 times the living minimum, 
but mostly at the expense of families not much higher up the income distribution. Espe-
cially families earning at or around the benefit cut-off level “may be in the position where 
increasing hours of work will result in the loss of the child or parents’ allowance” [Heady 
and Smith 1994]. The Klaus government eventually forced a compromise through par-
liament that staggered loss of benefits for people living at one to two times the living 
minimum. However, targetting seems to have upset a Czech population comfortable with 
the type of social solidarity implied by universal benefits and deeply rooted in national 
traditions. Conflict over targeting of social support corresponded with a substantial in-
crease in support for the Czech Social Democratic Party, raising the question of how suc-
cessful the neo-liberals will be in recasting the Czech welfare state in the long term. 
Poland: The Ignored Social Dimension 
In Poland, there was no overall vision of transitional social policy. Unlike the pro-active 
measures taken in the Czech Republic, Polish social policy has reacted to the fiscal crisis 
of the state more than it has conformed to any particular short or long-term strategy 
[Ksiezopolski 1993: 192]. What social policies did emerge were mostly emergency meas-
ures, some of them so ill-planned or ill-conceived that they frustrated development of 
long-term solutions. This was most notably the case with unemployment benefits and 
pension reform, both of which relied on a dangerous relaxation of eligibility criteria. Cash 
benefits to the unemployed and pensioners expanded dramatically, crowding out invest-
ments in health and education that are necessary for future growth. Although Poland un-
doubtedly entered the transformation period poorer and more indebted than the Czech 
Republic, poverty alone does not explain the failures of Polish social policy. Poor gov-
ernment planning and administration of benefit systems were important factors and are 
direct results of a shock therapy strategy of rapid economic transformation that tended to 
ignore the social dimension, or believe its reform could be safely postponed. Delaying 
social safety net reform and emphasis on ad hoc emergency measures damaged the ability 
of the state to deliver social services and further immiserated the population during the 
transition. 
A surprising and contradictory personality in the Polish social transition was Jacek 
Kuroñ, the first post-1989 Minister of Labour and Social Policy. In his short memoirs of 
his time in the Labour Ministry (entitled Moja Zupa [My Soup] [Kuroñ 1991]), after the 
“Kuroñówka” soup that became a symbol of poverty relief under shock therapy, Kuroñ 
admits that post-1989 social policy had many shortcomings. He explains that Solidarity 
was simply unprepared to take power when it unexpectedly won the June 1989 elections. 
The book essentially describes how a Minister came to power with a group of under-
ground printers, editors, and trade unionists and was overwhelmed by events. While this 
may have been true, the shock therapy economic program was carefully planned, dis-
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cussed and elaborated in numerous committees, with support from Western governments 
and international institutions. Kuroñ himself founded a committee of economists to plan 
radical macro-economic reforms in 1988. Social policy, however, bounced from emer-
gency measure to emergency measure, reflecting its low priority in government concerns 
[Graham 1994: 193]. No convincing overall vision of social policy was produced, just 
stopgap relief measures represented by Kuroñ’s soup. 
Health Care Disintegration 
Although the pattern of incoherent reform and disintegration of the social safety net is 
visible across the board in Poland, it has been perhaps most dramatic in the health care 
system. Health care in Poland fell prey to the country’s fiscal crisis in 1991, when real 
expenditures dropped over 9 percent, while the cost of medicine and equipment increased 
dramatically. Health care investment dropped 16 percent between 1990 and 1992 in real 
terms and wages in the health sector fell to 9 percent below the average wage level, while 
the number of people employed in health care also fell about 5 percent [Golinowska 
1994: 37-42]. A new system of health care finance, based on an insurance model, was 
debated during the first years of reform, but was never implemented, partly because the 
World Bank recommended that Poles could not afford an extra health insurance payroll 
tax [Millard 1994: 6]. Without dedicated revenue sources, the health system lost funding 
and a two-tier system began to emerge, often without state regulation or intent: private, 
fee-for-service, health care for those who could afford it, and an increasingly restricted 
range of free state services for everyone else.2 Part of this trend occurred through an ex-
pansion of private health care providers that accepted only cash payments, but also 
through developments in the state system where fees began to be charged for certain pro-
cedures, for citizens living outside the local health district, or by “private” doctors who 
had appropriated (or “rented”) state facilities in a process analagous to the “spontaneous” 
privatization of state-owned industrial enterprises. For instance, one region of Poland 
leased its only urology clinic to a private practitioner at exceedingly low rates, making 
certain essential services unavailable within the free state system [Millard 1994: 9; Ksie-
zopolski 1993: 184].3 
Besides the fiscal crisis that resulted in a de facto commercialization of health ser-
vices, the Polish state lost any ability to guarantee health care access through a process of 
decentralization that empowered wojewód (district) health offices, over the central Minis-
try of Health. The majority of Poland’s health budget is paid in lump sums to the 49 dis-
                                                     
2) Balicki [1994: 157] writes, “In the situation of disequilibrium between the obligations of the 
state and the possibility of their realization, there have arisen different informal methods of regu-
lating access, often unopen, together with the privileging of certain groups of patients… This 
situation is particularly disadvantageous for economically weaker groups, for whom access to a 
number of services has lately been limited, despite the still existing provision in the constitution 
guaranteeing free care.” The author, an employee of the Ministry of Health, blames the “weakness 
of the Ministry of Health and Social Care as leader of the transformation, the lack of an overall 
vision of change, the pressure of current matters and insufficient intellectual attention to long-term 
activities.” [Ibid.: 156]. 
3) Golinowska and Ochocki [1994: 11] conclude that, “The process of commercialization in this 
sphere does not proceed in a regulated manner, which causes the increase in payments for social 
services to act in a blind manner, destroying the principles of social solidarity in such spheres of 
human life as sickness and the raising of future generations”. 
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trict offices that set policy and allocate budgets in the regions. District health officers are 
appointed by the wojewód (district governor), who is in turn appointed by the Chief of the 
Council of Ministers, a cabinet-level position that is in fact stronger than the Minister of 
Health. While the Ministry of Health handles the central budget, the Chief of the Council 
of Ministers and the wojewód are in charge of personnel decisions in the state health ser-
vice, as well as in many policy and budget decisions. This system of financing makes it 
extremely difficult to create and enforce a national health policy. Since individual dis-
tricts and even towns are on different systems of financing, many state health care pro-
viders only give free care to residents of their district. A resident of Wroc³aw who has a 
car accident in Poznañ may not be eligible for free care there, for instance [Millard 1994: 
5-7; Halik 1993]. Probably the greatest irony of the health care disintegration in Poland is 
that the World Bank has lately criticized the reduction of health expenditures in Poland, 
while several years earlier, it encouraged decentralization and opposed the introduction of 
a general health insurance system, such as the Czech Republic used to maintain a high 
level of universal health care. 
Pension Explosion and Fiscal Imbalance 
While health care and education funding plummeted in real terms in 1991, government 
spending on pensions exploded, creating a fiscal crisis that crowded out more investment-
oriented and better-targeted forms of social spending. Rapid expansion of pension pay-
ments was a direct result of over-generous and ill-conceived initial attempts to sooth the 
social costs of the transformation by extending pension and unemployment benefits. Ja-
cek Kuroñ, the first Solidarity Minister of Labour and Social Policy, was responsible for 
many of these initial policy mistakes. His good intentions, honest social conscience, and 
generous benefits made him the most popular politician in Poland, but technically, his 
programs have been a disaster. Workers over a certain age who lost their jobs due to pri-
vatization or restructuring became eligible for early retirement. As a result, the number of 
people collecting pensions mushroomed, the average retirement age for men decreased to 
57 (the official retirement age is 65), and many of these people continued to work, often 
in the “grey” or unofficial sector. Similarly, unemployment benefits were initially set at 
levels high enough to discourage people from seeking work. 
Table 6. Rapid Increase of Pensioners in Poland (in thousands) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Retirement Age Population 4,799 4,903 4,979 5,062 
 Percent Growth 1.9 2.2 1.6 1.7 
Number of Retirees and Pensioners 6,827 7,104 7,944 8,495 
 Percent Growth 2.4 4.0 11.8 6.9 
Economically-Active Persons per one  
 Retiree or Pensioner 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 
Source: Golinowska [1994: 33-35]. 
 
The swift increase in the number of persons collecting benefits, coupled with a reduction 
in the number of people contributing to the social insurance funds (FUS and FRUS), 
caused them to run a tremendous deficit that had to be filled from the state budget. While 
in 1988, only 4.7 percent of the state budget went for social insurance subsidies (to the 
nominally independent social insurance funds), in 1992 that level reached 20 percent and 
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continued to grow. The government eventually managed to reduce the level of pension 
indexation from 100 percent to 91 percent of average wage growth, but generous eligibil-
ity criteria, once adopted, destroyed the fiscal balance of the system and political resis-
tance to reducing pensions prevented any meaningful reforms throughout 1995. 
Table 7. Pension Payments in Comparative Perspective 
 Czech Republic Poland Hungary 
Minimum Retirement Age 
 Men 60 65 60 
 Women 53-57 60 55 
Minimum Contributory Years for Eligibility 
 Men 25 25 25 
 Women 25 20 25 
% of Wage Replaced by Pension According to Law 
 Net 54% 55% 67% 
 Nominal 50% 55% 63% 
Average Pension as Percent of Average Wage 
 (Percent of Average Wage Actually Replaced)* 49% 74% 49% 
Pensions in Percent of GDP 10.2% 14.8% 10.6% 
Social Security in Percent of GDP 21% 19.9% 27.6% 
Source: Vittas and Michelitsch [1995].  
*) The authors conclude that, “In Poland, the high replacement rate is attributed to 
the large upward adjustment of pensions effected in 1991 and the subsequent in-
dexation of pensions to average wages” [Ibid.: 8]. Notice that pensions crowd out 
other social security spending in Poland. 
 
In the SLD-PSL government, pensions became the source of a controversy between Fi-
nance Minister, Grzegorz Ko³odko, and Labour Minister, Leszek Miller. Ko³odko wanted 
to index pensions to price rather than wage growth and introduce private pension insur-
ance. Miller, on the other hand, wanted to maintain the current system in slightly altered 
form, while introducing a system of supplementary private pensions for more affluent 
citizens. In fact, a system of private pension insurance rose up spontaneously, without any 
specific legislation or tax incentives, simply because the basic pension was inadequate for 
wealthier Poles and because some companies wanted to offer pension benefits to attract 
employees (The Financial Voice 9: 37, 1994). Similar to pensions, generous unemploy-
ment benefits in Poland created a significant drain on the state budget, while crowding 
out investments in active labor market policies such as retraining and job creation. 
Social Assistance 
The 1989 Law on Social Assistance intended, like the living minimum in the Czech Re-
public, to create a social safety net to protect people who fell below the poverty line, ei-
ther temporarily or permanently. However, problems emerged with the financing and 
administration of the Polish safety net and it is impossible to say that the safety net has 
effectively guarded against poverty. In the Polish system, some benefits are funded by the 
central government through earmarked contributions to the local budget, but administered 
by the local gmina governments, who have social assistance centers staffed with social 
workers. Other benefits are funded by the gmina itself from local taxes [“Poland: In-
come…” 1993: 33-35]. Although central and local government expenditures on social 
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assistance rose steadily throughout the transition, they could not keep pace with the rate 
of growth of social problems. Since the payments are administered locally, budget short-
falls produced a patchy distribution of benefits, with some families getting the full bene-
fits and others receiving only a fraction of what they are eligible for under the law 
[Graham 1994: 242]. In 1995, all families earning less than 855.8 new z³oty per month 
were eligible for social assistance (in line with the minimum pension), although the Soli-
darity trade union proposed that the social minimum should be 589.4 z³oty, or 60 percent 
of the socially-defined poverty line. Despite generous calculation of the living minimum, 
420,000 families, or approximately one-third of the poor, were not receiving full benefits. 
In some cases, they received only 50 z³oty ($20) per person per month (Gazeta Wybor-
cza, 31 May 1995). The World Bank concluded that, “Whilst voivodships have some 
monitoring functions, it is not clear whether the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy or 
any other national body has any responsibility for looking at the ways in which the com-
missioned tasks are carried out, or the consistency of decisions” [“Poland: Income…” 
1993: 65]. Caught between generous official benefits, rather less generous actual pay-
ments, and an inefficient delivery system, the Polish social safety net had serious holes 
during the entire transformation period, undoubtedly leading to discontent with reform, 
both among the poor and among others who lived in proximity to poor families and sym-
pathized with a plight that was often caused by unemployment [Grootaert 1995]. Feelings 
of social solidarity are quite high in Poland, making it difficult for people to accept that 
perhaps one-fourth of the population is living in poverty. Disintegration of the social 
safety net shattered expectations of security and social solidarity that were fostered under 
socialism and before. Many Poles simply felt abandoned by the new democratic state. 
Conclusion 
While the Czech Republic implemented a strong package of social policies that helped 
smooth the transition to a market economy, Poland’s social safety net fragmented and fell 
apart. Initial conditions clearly played a role in this, since Poland was and is a poorer 
country, had a history of greater problems with poverty [Milanoviæ 1991], and faced 
more difficult macro-economic challenges in 1989. Nonetheless, the failure of transitional 
social policy in Poland resulted not only from worse initial conditions, as some authors 
argue [Balcerowicz 1994], but from Solidarity’s lack of policy direction in this area and 
the low priority of social policy in shock therapy strategy. Policy planning occurred in 
other policy areas, where the government made major achievements despite scarce re-
sources.  
Evidence presented here points to the fact that in Poland, resources were misallo-
cated, creating great contrasts between over-generous pension benefits on the one hand 
and a disintegrating health care system on the other. Initial choices, like the 1991 decision 
to increase pension benefits and eligibility, have proven politically difficult (indeed im-
possible) to reverse, suggesting that better planning in the early stages would have pre-
vented significant long-term problems. 
Czech experience underlines the importance of planning and overall strategy in 
shaping transitional social policy. The social-liberal model of economic transformation in 
the Czech Republic sought to conduct a transformation in the social sphere concurrent 
with radical macro-economic reforms. New social policy institutions, such as the General 
Health Insurance Fund, and new financing and delivery systems were developed at the 
same time as market institutions, so that emergency relief measures did not crowd out the 
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development of long-term solutions. Because it began work at an early stage, the Czech 
Republic is the only country in East Central Europe that has created an effective social 
safety net [Götting 1994; “Crisis…” 1994]4 – albeit a residual one that provides only bare 
minimum standards, compared to the more elaborate Western, and especially Scandina-
vian, systems. 
One further condition that seems to have helped the Czech Republic pursue a suc-
cessful social policy is the greater centralization and efficiency of its state administration. 
Poland decentralized most social welfare functions in 1990, placing them under the au-
thority of local self-governments, rather than in the local branch of state administration. 
While this may have been good for Polish democracy, it had tragic results for social ser-
vice provision in some regions. Better organization and planning of the social safety net 
probably would have alleviated Poland’s social crisis, despite scarce resources. 
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